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2”economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very diﬀerent per-
formance characteristics than the ﬁrst economy because of diﬀerent informal norms and
enforcement [with the implication that] transferring the formal political and economic rules
of successful Western economies to third-world and Eastern European economies is not a
suﬃcient condition for good economic performance.”– North (1994, 8)
”Institutional ’copycatting’ may have been useful for Poland, but it is much less clear that
it was relevant or practical for Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan”– Rodrik (2005, 29)
1 Research questions
This survey outlines the literature on economic growth and development with respect to
the following questions: (i) To what extend do public policies inﬂuence economic growth?
(ii) Which policy mix might optimize a country’s rate of growth and development?
Indeed, if we succeed in identifying key policies that foster economic growth, the implemen-
tation of optimal growth strategies could cut world poverty and aﬀect income inequalities
across countries.1 However, we implicitly need to solve a closely related puzzle ﬁrst in order
to be prepared to deﬁne the scope of public policies: What are the key determinant of
economic growth and development?
While the importance to identify the key determinants of economic growth is obvious,
a uniﬁed theory that matches empirical facts is still missing. Instead, the emergence of
endogenous growth theory since the early 90s induced a vast strand of literature cover-
ing numerous potential determinants of economic growth and development ranging from
macroeconomic policies over trade and industrial policies to deep-seated institutional fac-
tors and initial conditions. Clearly, policymakers have direct control over some of these
factors, but only limited (long-term) or no control over others.
If we have a closer look at the empirical part of the literature, the overall picture still re-
mains puzzling. In particular, Summers (2003) suggests three main ingredients for growth:
(i) economic integration through trade and investment, (ii) maintenance of sustainable gov-
ernment ﬁnances and sound money and (iii) an institutional environment in favor of contract
enforcements and property rights. He concludes: ”I would challenge anyone to identify a
1The poverty line is deﬁned by 1 $ in purchasing power parities per day (static) by the Worldbank so
that better growth strategies would reduce world poverty if the status quo is suboptimal. Moreover, Rodrik
(2005) illustrates that disparities in income across countries account for the bulk of global disparities.
3country that has done all three of these things and has not grown at a substantial rate”
(Summers, 2003). Indeed, this policy mix appears to be intuitively appealing. Yet, Rodrik
(2005) illustrates that corresponding inferences for policy implications are not generally
consistent with empirical facts. Table 1 shows that Latin American countries experienced
sustained growth during the 1960s and 1970s which represent periods of import substitution
policies (high barriers to trade and capital ﬂows) - e.g. El Salvador undertook tremendous
reforms since 1989 in favor of macro stabilization, trade liberalization and private sector
deregulations without achieving higher growth (see Figure 1). Contrarily, Figure 2 illus-
trates that economic growth took oﬀ in India in the early 1980s while economic reforms did
not take place before 1991. Instead, the initial growth take-oﬀ was preceded by substantial
public investments in infrastructure in the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as a gradual
shift towards a more ”business-friendly” policy environment at that time.2 Table 2 denote
that China, Vietnam, India and Uganda have experienced tremendous growth during the
1990s in the presence of major barriers to trade and capital ﬂows.3 Moreover, the index of
overall property rights from the Frasier Institute of Economic Freedom reports for China a
index number of 6.8 in 1985 and 4.9 in 2000 which is below the one of Mali, Iran, Panama
or Romania.
Consequently, it appears that we need to take some care in isolating growth-enhancing poli-
cies and keep in mind to incorporate country speciﬁc conditions accurately. Nevertheless,
recent advances in development accounting are pointing the way for future research. Caselli
(2005) provides a comprehensive survey and various robustness checks of contributions in
development accounting. He concludes that the fraction of the variance of income across
countries that is explained by variations in factor accumulation (labor, physical and human
capital) accounts exclusively for around 40% (upper bound). Thus, the bulk of international
income diﬀerences is due to variations in total factor productivity (TFP). It follows that
a successful theory needs to explain why some countries catch up in terms of productivity
(TFP) while others lag behind.
In general, endogenous growth theories initiated by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992), where by endogenous we refer to models of endogenous technical change, are able
to explain TFP-diﬀerences due to technical change across countries. These theories dis-
close new theoretical mechanisms for public policies to inﬂuence innovative activities and
2See Rodrik (2005) for a more detailed description of the growth take-oﬀ in India.
3In particular, China and Vietnam achieved sustained growth in the absence of trade liberalizations or
enhancements of property rights since almost three decades.
4TFP-growth - each policy which aﬀects the productivity or cost structure of specialized
intermediate producers impacts on the rate of technological progress in the economy.4 This
class of models was extended to distinguish between economies that adopt technologies
developed elsewhere and innovating ones. Indeed, it is a well-founded stylized fact that
almost all technologies are developed within a few advanced countries. Figure 5 and 6
support this ﬁnding. Moreover, Figure 7 exempliﬁes the importance of international tech-
nology diﬀusion (from the U.S.) in the Canadian pharmaceutical sector.5 The theoretical
work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) or Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002) distinguishes be-
tween imitating (adopting) and innovating countries and predicts that a country’s long-run
growth rate depends exclusively on the rate of technical progress in few leading countries.
The innovator and the imitator exhibit the same conditional growth rate in a balanced
growth path. The corresponding income diﬀerences depend on the capacity of imitating
countries to absorb foreign technologies. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) view the secu-
rity of property rights, taxation and infrastructure as the key determinants of a country’s
absorptive capacity. Some later models show that growth rates might even diverge if a
country’s stage of development is too low leading to ”convergence clubs”of economies with
similar stages of development.6 Apart from political or institutional constraints to adopt
innovative technologies, see e.g. Parente and Prescott (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2002),
the determinants of a country’s absorptive capacity are seen as the key for its economic
development and technological (TFP-) catch up.
Indeed, a closer look at some case studies supports the pivotal role of TFP-growth as an
engine of overall growth in GDP per capita. Table 1 clearly indicates that variations in
the growth rate of GDP per capita in Latin America from 1960 until 2000 are primarily
due to variations in TFP-growth. The periods of high sustained growth in the 1960s and
1970s comply with periods of high TFP-growth, while the large decrease in GDP-growth in
the 1980s is accompanied by a sharp drop in TFP-growth. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that
growth in India is driven primarily by TFP-growth. More precisely, Figure 3 and 4 reveal
that before 1980, states with a lot of manufacturing activity performed generally poorly,
while thereafter, growth is driven primarily by manufacturing intensive states.7 The catch
4In particular, this approach to economic growth concedes an important role to industrial policies
discussed below.
5More generally, there is various empirical support in favor of the importance of international technology
diﬀusion to determine a country’s TFP-growth rate, see Keller (2004) for a comprehensive survey.
6See e.g. Basu and Weil (1998) or Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) for divergence in growth rates because
of skill-biased technical change and Benhabid and Spiegel (2005) because of a lack of human capital.
7See Rodrik (2005) for a more detailed description of the growth take-oﬀ in India.
5up in TFP of India’s manufacturing sector, accompanied with increasing technical change
in that sector, appears to support theories of technology diﬀusion and adoption of foreign
technologies. Figure 5 illustrates that TFP-growth is also the primary source of China’s
’growth-takeoﬀ’. It also suggests that the enhancement of productivity may be linked to
improvements in the provision of telecommunication infrastructure which also took oﬀ in
the end of the 1970s. Consequently, we mainly focus on the role of public policies to foster
economic growth via innovations and technological catch-up.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss theoretical and empir-
ical approaches to isolate key mechanisms for innovation and growth that allow for a direct
or indirect role of public policies. In particular, we analyze the literature with respect to the
following questions: Whether and how does human capital facilitate the diﬀusion of tech-
nologies across countries? Are local complementarities between human capital - knowledge
ﬂows - important and what measures (e.g. brain gain policies) support them? Does the
optimal composition of education change with the transitional path of an economy? What
are the dynamics gains from trade liberalization - does trade convey technology spillovers?
Whether and how trade policies inﬂuence the incentives to innovate? Under which circum-
stances do foreign direct investments (FDI) lead to technology transfers? What policy mea-
sures support such environments of knowledge ﬂows via FDI? Do infrastructure investments
inﬂuence the incentives to innovate and foster technological catch-up? Do macroeconomic
policies/stability aﬀect the composition of investments and hence innovations and long-run
growth? What is the role of ﬁnancial development in fostering the incentives to innovate or
imitate - is there a compositional eﬀect (e.g. credits vs. market-based system)? Whether
and how industrial policies (e.g. deregulation of entry) impact on technological progress?
Do R&D subsidies promote innovation and growth?
In section 3, we derive the corresponding open empirical hypothesis from the literature.
Section 4 describes the feasible data sets which are necessary to analysis these hypoth-
esis. In the subsequent section, we suggest a list of potential research papers resulting
from the above analysis. Finally, we suggest the responsibilities for the research and the
corresponding timetables in the last two sections.
62 Theoretical approaches and empirical evidence
In the following, we discuss theoretical approaches and the corresponding empirical support
for several key determinants of innovation, growth and technology diﬀusion that are either
directly or indirectly (institutional reforms) controlled by policymakers.
Human capital:
Initially, Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) account for human capital as a productive in-
put that accumulates knowledge by assuming the absence of diminishing returns for the
combination of private and human capital. That is , the authors explicitly assume that
human capital and technological knowledge are one and the same. Based on this (AK-)
assumption they are able to show formally that an increase in human capital is growth-
enhancing. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) consider an
alternative growth-channel of human capital: Human capital facilitates the adoption of for-
eign technologies. The policy implications of distinguishing between education as a factor
of production or technology diﬀusion (TFP) are signiﬁcant. In the former, the beneﬁt of a
rise in education is its marginal product, while in the latter it is the sum of its eﬀect on all
output levels in the future. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) discriminate between both eﬀects
empirically. They estimate equations of the following type:





+ φt + θi (1)
where a refers to total factor productivity, h to human capital and ymax/yi to the productivity-
distance of country i with respect to the leader country. The authors detect positive es-
timates for the coeﬃcient m which reﬂects that a country’s capacity to absorb foreign
technologies is increasing in its level of human capital. The same authors extend this idea
in a later article to account for the possibility of a disadvantage in technological backward-
ness ` a la Howitt (2000). That is, Benhabid and Spiegel (2005) assume a tradeoﬀ in relatively
technological backwardness: On the one hand, there is an advantage of backwardness since
the country can choose to adopt new technologies from a larger menu. On the other hand,
it is harder to adopt more complex, skilled-biased technologies if the country lags behind
the world technology frontier. It follows that technological laggards may converge or di-
verge in terms of productivity and growth depending on their level of human capital. In
the empirical part of the article, the authors show that the predictions of the model based
7on the educational levels within countries match the growth performance of many emerging
economies during the last 40 years quite well.
The positive link between human capital and growth raises the issue of policy interventions
and the ﬁnancing of education. Interventions are justiﬁed if social returns exceed private
ones.8 This is the case in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) due to the positive social externality
on technological progress. Yet, a number of studies do not conﬁrm their results. Heckman
and Klenow (1997) compare individual with cross-country Mincer wage regressions. If the
latter outweigh the former, social returns exceed private. The authors ﬁnd positive sup-
port for excessive social returns. Yet, when they control for technology diﬀerences across
countries the rates become similar. Likewise, Topel (1999) shows that the social coeﬃcient
resembles the private if year-dummies are accounted for. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999)
conduct an instrumental variable approach and can not approve deviations between social
and private returns.9 Yet, their results depend crucially on the validity of their instruments
- individual education is instrumented by a dummy for the quarter of birth and average
education is approximated by compulsory school attendance laws. Krueger and Lindahl
(2001) provide robust micro-economic evidence for the existence of private returns, but
assess weak macro-economic support for externalities on technical progress from the stock
of human capital. In particular, its coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant when restricting the regres-
sion to OECD countries.10 Their results are contrary to Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). An
attempt to reconcile both studies suggests that education matters only for technological
catch-up, but not for frontier innovations.
A general critique which applies to all of these studies is the negligence of qualitative aspects
of education. Yet, empirical examinations suﬀer from the scarcity of available qualitative
measures of human capital since conventional proxies are typically based on quantitative
measures of education, e.g. years of schooling. Still, several authors suggest empirical
strategies to account for the quality of education. Barro (1991) apply student-teacher ra-
tios across countries as a measure for quality. Yet, the evidence is weak since the ratio is
8Social rate of returns are typically measured as the eﬀect of human capital on GDP, while private
ones follow from Mincer wage regressions that estimate the individual return from an additional year of
schooling.
9Similarly, Teulings and van Rens (2003) approve that private and social returns to education are equal
in the short run.
10The authors argue that the assumption of a constant coeﬃcient between initial education and growth
across countries is ﬂaw.
8negatively related to the number of primary, but not secondary years of schooling. Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Bils and Klenow (2000) provide positive evidence that the
human capital of the young generation (students) depends on the amount of human capital
of the old generation (teacher). Finally, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) demonstrate the im-
portance of the quality of human capital. They detect a strong causal relation running from
the quality of the labor-force to economic growth. Their results are based on international
measures of math and science test scores for 39 countries from Barro and Lee (1996a).11 At
the same time they ﬁnd no evidence that public spending on schooling resources inﬂuences
performance diﬀerences of students. Their ﬁndings support R&D based growth theories
` a la Romer (1990) where human capital aﬀects the supply of technologies and knowledge
transfers. Thus, the large social growth-externality from the quality of the labor force ac-
knowledges the earlier results from Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). Still, the discussion shows
that there appears to be a non-trivial mapping from (quality) measures of schooling to the
quality of the labor-force.
A diﬀerent strand of the literature focuses on strategic complementarities between human
capital. Kremer (1993) assumes a special production function where production consists of
diﬀerent production processes. In each production process workers can make mistakes with
a certain probability depending on their quality. Thus, it diﬀers from the standard speciﬁ-
cation in the sense that the quality of workers can not be substituted by the quantity in each
production process.12 The speciﬁcation yields strategic complementarities in human capital
and hence multiple equilibria. Finally, some authors stress diﬀerences/persintencies in the
world income distribution due to a complementarity between technology and skill (skill-
biased technologies), e.g. Redding (1996), Basu and Weil (1998), Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) or Jovanovic (1996). This complementarity leads to imperfect technology diﬀusion
and hence international income diﬀerences. Hence, it provides a microeconomic foundation
for the Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)-approach. Moreover, it implies growth-eﬀects due to
improvements in human capital, higher protections of intellectual property rights and lower
import tariﬀs. In general, strategic externalities in human capital exhibit a promising ap-
proach to reﬁne our understanding of (local) knowledge interactions and hence the process
11Note that the authors identify implausibly large estimates since an increase in on standard deviation
in the test scores enhances annual economic growth by more than 1%.
12He motivates the approach by the ’O-Ring’ - a component of the Challenger space shuttle that costs a
few cents but ﬁnally caused its explosion.
9of technology diﬀusion.
Finally, a number of recent studies associate the composition of human capital and educa-
tion with economic growth. In the models outlined above, primary, secondary and tertiary
education are implicitly regarded as perfect substitutes. In particular, Acemoglu et al.
(2002) and Aghion and Howitt (2005) argue that diﬀerent stages of economic development
require diﬀerent skills. Thus, the closer a country gets to the world technology frontier, the
more important is higher (tertiary) education to promote R&D. In contrast, imitation of
foreign technologies requires basic (primary & secondary) education. Aghion and Howitt
(2005) use this approach to explain productivity diﬀerences between the U.S. and the EU.
In particular, 37.3% of the U.S. population between 25-64 have completed a higher educa-
tion degree in 1999-2000, while only 23.8% of the EU population. Furthermore, educational
expenditure on tertiary education amount for 3% of GDP in the U.S. against 1.4% in the
EU. Vandenbussche et al. (2004) and Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2005)
provide empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis, whereas the former apply data for 22
OECD countries and the latter data for U.S. states. In both cases, they detect a positive
interaction term between the distance to the world technological frontier (measured in TFP)
and higher education, albeit it loses its signiﬁcant if they control for country ﬁxed eﬀect in
the former case. Likewise, Caspari et al. (2004) underline the empirical importance of the
lack of tertiary education in Germany vs. the U.S. to explain growth diﬀerences between
the two countries and Krueger and Kumar (2004) stress that skill-speciﬁc rather than gen-
eral eduction in Europe vs. the U.S. causes a productivity gap. In general, this approach
can be regarded as an application of a broader theoretical framework which suggest that
diﬀerent institutional frameworks are required for diﬀerent stages of economic development
as argued by Rodrik (2005).
Trade policies and partners:
The literature on trade and growth identiﬁes three static gains from (completely) integrating
in the world economy with respect to international trade in goods and factors:13 (i) an
improved allocation of input factors (e.g. capital and labor), (ii) higher productivity due to
a specialization of production, (iii) increase in market size. The ﬁrst eﬀect is due to eﬃciency
13See Ventura (2005) for a uniﬁed approach to demonstrate these gains from trade under several market
imperfections.
10gains from reallocating factors from regions/industries in which they were abundant in
autarky into those in which they were scarce. The second results from a specialization of
production in products where a region’s comparative (productivity) advantage is highest.
The last captures the fact that ﬁxed costs for the design of new specialized products need
to be paid for only once, but can be sold in the entire (integrated) market. While all regions
share the gains from the last two eﬀects, the reallocation of factors might create losses for
regions where factors are scarce. Ventura (2005) points out that the entry of large regions in
the integrated economy might generate losses for countries with similar factor proportions
because that region absorbs scarce factors. Consequently, trade liberalization in China
or India might create negative externalities for economies with similar factor proportions
in Latin America or Eastern Europe.14 Nevertheless, it can be shown that an economic
integration of the world economy leads to a Pareto-improvement for all countries if it is
coupled with an appropriate (intra-regional) transfer scheme. The author infers a general
prescription for development: ’open up and integrate in the world economy’.
The translation of static into dynamic gains depends on the scope of diminishing returns
and market size eﬀects. Ventura (2005) illustrates that economic integration features only
level but not growth eﬀects if diminishing returns to capital, which is the only state variable,
are strong and market size eﬀects are weak. Contrary, the framework results in persistent
growth eﬀects due to increasing/constant returns to capital if diminishing returns are weak
relative to market size eﬀects. Moreover, the author analyzes the consequences of several
impediments to international trade. He shows that the gains from economic integration can
be sustained completely if we exclusively allow for trade in goods and not factors as long
as the factor prize equalization (FPE) holds - e.g. diﬀerences in factor proportions across
regions are small relative to diﬀerences in factor proportions across industries. In addition,
he characterizes the dynamics of the world income distribution accounting for deviations
from FPE due to extreme factor proportions across regions, the existence of regions with
insuﬃcient high-productivity industries or the presence of transport costs (gradual global-
ization). In many cases, these deviations generate additional forces towards the stability
of the world income distribution due to supplementary mechanics in favor of diminishing
returns and the general prescription for development of ’opening up and integrate in the
world economy’ is sustained.15
14Contrary, gains from trade are larger for countries with diﬀerent factor shares like the USA or EU.
15An exception is the friction of transport costs that apply only to intermediate goods. These entail
potentially agglomeration eﬀects across regions.
11However, the dynamics described above exclusively focus on the evolution of the private
capital stock over time. That is, the capital stock, possibly embedding technical knowledge,
is the only state variable of the system. Yet, a complementary strand of the literature on
trade and growth emphasizes the existence of dynamic gains from trade via transfers of
embedded technologies.16 Growth models of endogenous technical change provide a natural
framework to study the eﬀect of trade (in intermediates) on the incentives to innovate.17
In this context, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) study the eﬀect of a liberalization of trade
in goods in a symmetric two-country model. In this case, opening up to free trade does not
imply permanent eﬀects on the incentives to innovate (and hence growth) if the diﬀusion of
knowledge is intra-national in scope. The reason is that the beneﬁts as well as the (labor)
costs of R&D increase by the same amount. Yet, Devereux and Lapham (1994) show that
the outcome is diﬀerent in the asymmetric case because the initially richer country carries
out all research in equilibrium while the incentive to innovate is eliminated forever in the
poorer one. Thus, the former specializes in research and the latter in manufacturing which
augments the overall resources devoted to research in the richer country and the welfare
in both countries (equally). In contrast, the rate of technical change and hence long-run
growth increases in both cases if technology diﬀusion is international in scope. This re-
sults directly from the public good characteristics of knowledge - the combined stock of
knowledge/technologies exerts a higher externality on future research. A more empirically
founded framework constitute product cycle models which are based on the observation that
new goods are invented in the North while the South imitates vintage goods.18 Helpman
(1993) analyzes the eﬀect of intellectual property rights (IPR) in this framework. He demon-
strates that tighter IPRs not necessarily improve the rate of innovation in the North, but
unambiguously reduce the rate of imitation (and hence convergence) in the South. Finally,
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) argue that it the presence of skill-biased technical change
as discussed above, the South has an incentive to protect IPRs in order to attract more
suitable innovations.19 It follows that a combination of trade opening and weak protection
16To capture these dynamics formally, one needs to introduce the stock of technologies as an additional,
independent state variable.
17Grossman and Helpman (1995) provide a comprehensive survey of the early literature on trade and
technology.
18Hence, these models suppose a slow diﬀusion of technologies across advanced and less developed coun-
tries.
19One might conclude that trade openness increases international income diﬀerences by aggravating the
skill-biased in technologies in this case. Yet, general statements are diﬃcult since they depend on the
equalization of factor prizes (FPE) across countries which in turn depend on factor compositions, the
12of IPRs in the South can impede their rate of growth (in the absence of FPE) as outlined
by Gancia (2003). The discussion shows that the role of IPRs in innovation and growth
is not obvious and that the dynamics between trade and growth (at least quantitatively)
depend on the strength of international technology diﬀusion.20
A number of empirical studies verify the global dimension of technology spillovers. Yet,
the diﬀusion process is far from perfect. Keller (2002a) ﬁnds that the geographic distance
is an important determinant of the diﬀusion of technologies between countries.21 Indeed, a
number of studies also demonstrate the importance of international trade ﬂows in order to
explain spillovers of technologies. Thus, trade itself provides a mechanism for international
technology diﬀusion. Coe and Helpman (1995) apply a cointegration analysis to investigate
the eﬀect of domestic and foreign R&D on domestic TFP. The econometric framework seems
appropriate since conventional test indicate the presence of a unit root for both variables.
In particular, they estimate the following speciﬁcation for 22 OECD countries:




ct + ct (2)
where S
f
ct is deﬁned as the bilateral import-share weighted R&D stocks of the trade partners.
The authors ﬁnd large positive eﬀects from import-weighted foreign R&D (βf). Coe and
Hoﬀmaister (1997) generalize these ﬁndings for a larger set of 77 advanced and developed
countries. Keller (1998) relativizes these ﬁndings by demonstrating that the import shares
in the construction of the foreign R&D variable are not essential to achieve their result.
Yet, Keller (2002b) detects signiﬁcant spillovers from foreign R&D to TFP via international
trade using industry data for thirteen industries and eight countries. Overall, the impacts of
foreign R&D from the same and diﬀerent industries amount for 20% of the overall spillovers.
Xu and Wang (1999) and Caselli and Coleman (2004) reﬁne the link between trade and
technology spillovers by focusing on trade in diﬀerentiated intermediate capital goods. The
estimates for the eﬀects of foreign R&D for domestic productivity increase in this case.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) impose a more structural approach to estimate the importance
of international trade for the transmission of technologies. They embed a Ricardian model
productivity of industries etc.
20Again, we stress that the impact of trade on growth is in general positive if FPE holds. If not, as is
often the case in reality (compare wages across countries), Grossman and Helpman (1995) illustrate that
opening up to trade can reduce economic growth in certain circumstances.
21He also isolates a common languages as an important component. This hints at a role of cultural factors
(similarity) in the identiﬁcation of global knowledge spillovers.
13of trade in an endogenous Schumpetarian growth model of quality improving innovations.
Based on a cross-section of 19 OECD countries, the authors ﬁnd that an improvements
in a country’s technology raises the welfare of all other countries. Finally, Clerides et al.
(1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999) reject the hypothesis that exports of goods inﬂu-
ence ﬁrm-level learning eﬀects using case studies of three developing countries and the U.S.
respectively.
The interrelations between trade and technological progress also provide a potential ba-
sis for trade policies. Note that the type of models outlined above imply two diﬀerent
sources of market imperfections: (i) a positive non-internalized externality of technologies
on future research and (ii) market power in the intermediate goods sector. Grossman and
Helpman (1995) demonstrate that trade policies as well as industrial policies in general
can lead to second-best welfare beneﬁts. Still, they stress that universal policy prescription
are far from obvious due to complex general equilibrium eﬀects that might counteract the
original intensions. The authors consider an example in which the success of a tariﬀ on
an import-competing sector to foster innovations depends on whether the favored sector
is a complement or substitute for the R&D sector in the general equilibrium production
structure. That is, if the favored sector requires the same input factor (e.g. skilled labor),
the equilibrium costs of this factor rise and R&D declines. However, some empirical case
studies support the view that a mixture of active trade and industrial policies can enhance
innovation and growth. In this regard, Rodrik (2005) describes the successful policy mix
of tariﬀ protection for traditional industries and export subsidies for innovative sectors in
South Korea or Taiwan. We will discuss some of these aspects in greater detail in the
section on industrial policy.
Finally, Baldwin and Forslid (2000) argue that trade liberalization inﬂuence the market
structure in the R&D sector. More speciﬁcally, they illustrate that reduction in transport
costs (i) reduce the value of intermediate ﬁrms by increase competition in R&D and (ii)
improve ﬁnancial intermediation by promoting asset trade. Both eﬀects improve the incen-
tives to invest in R&D in their framework.
Foreign direct investment:
Foreign direct investments (FDI) provide an additional potential transmission channel for
14the diﬀusion of technologies. The link is plausible since the sharing of knowledge among
multinational parents and subsidiaries represents a natural channel through which technol-
ogy can diﬀuse internationally. Moreover, foreign investors typically need to standardize
their production process to local environments which facilitates the local adoption of tech-
nologies. In this regard, FDI appears to be superior to trade in order to convey technology
spillovers.
In general, a potential foreign investor has a choice between direct investments and the
licensing of a technology to a foreign ﬁrms. The latter approach prevent the operation
in an unfamiliar business environment, but comes at the costs of moral hazard and the
reliance on contract enforcements which seem to be severe in an international context.
Indeed, Figure 8 suggests that most technology spillovers are due to indirect spillovers.
Additionally, Figure 9 and 10 illustrate that FDI of the USA (the technological leader) as
well as in the USA increases signiﬁcantly during the 1990s respectively. Hence, we focus
our analysis on FDI.
Grossman and Helpman (1995) emphasize two crucial theoretical aspects of the role of
technologies in FDI. First, investors need to enter the market with superior technologies
in order to be in a position to compete with locally owned ﬁrms in an unfamiliar business
environment. Second, R&D is the type of ﬁrm level ﬁxed costs that generates economies
of scale and hence incentives for FDI. Thus, technological progress boost the incentives for
FDI of the investor and the host country which hopes for larger productivity spillovers. In
this regard, FDI is also a major policy issue. Keller (2004) denotes that governments spend
large amounts of resources to attract FDI.22
The empirical evidence, however, is not that clear-cut. Recent surveys based on micro-level
productivity studies concluded that there is no evidence for productivity spillover via FDI
(Hanson (2001), Goerg and Greenaway (2002)). Aitken and Harrison (1999) conﬁrms these
results in a case study for Venezuela. Yet, the case studies of Larrain et al. (2000) and Liang
(2003) reports tremendous knowledge spillovers from Intel’s investments in Costa Rica and
FDI for Chinese telecommunication ﬁrms, respectively. Branstetter (2001) and Singh (2003)
exploit data on patent citations to investigate knowledge spillovers of FDI. The former de-
tects positive spillovers from the investor to the host country for Japanese FDI in the USA
22The U.S. state of Alabama spent $ 230 million in 1994 to attract a new plant of Mercedes Benz.
Likewise, the German state of Saxony spent a similar amount to attract a new plant of AMD in 2004.
15as well as the other way around. The latter, even ﬁnds that foreign subsidiaries learn more
from ﬁrms in the host country than vice versa for a panel of 10 OECD countries. These
results are somewhat surprising. Yet, Keller (2004) underlines that they might be due to an
endogeneity problem. Still, a number of studies provide robust empirical evidence in favor
of technology transfers to the host country focussing on a more direct approach, e.g. Xu
(2000), Griﬃth et al. (2003), Keller and Yeaple (2003). These studies, based on FDI-data
for the U.S. or U.K., ﬁnd that productivity growth in the host country is systematically
higher in industries with more FDI. In particular, Keller and Yeaple (2003) estimate large
quantitative eﬀects in high-technology compared to low-technology sectors. Consequently,
there exists various positive as well as negative evidence in favor of technology spillovers
from FDI, whereas, apart from methodological issues, the diﬀerence depends on the country
under study.23
In the following, we will see that theory can reconcile the conﬂicting empirical evidence
in a number of ways. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) employs a static equilibrium model where
productivity eﬀects arise via the provision of high-quality intermediate inputs. He high-
lights a tradeoﬀ for the host country: FDI increases the demand for intermediate goods and
services of local suppliers while it suppresses local competitors (reducing the demand for
local intermediates). Whether the net demand eﬀect is positive depends on transportation
costs and initial productivity diﬀerences in the model. Thus, the approach predicts that
the productivity eﬀect of FDI diﬀers according to country-speciﬁc conditions.24 Fosfuri
et al. (2001) concentrate on productivity spillovers through labor training and turnover in
the host country to justify FDI-spillovers. Indeed, Larrain et al. (2000) outline that In-
tel funded schools that taught local workers in Costa Rica. Several contributions suggest
a number of additional factors that inﬂuence the existence of productivity spillovers from
FDI. Blomstr¨ om and Kokko (1998) and Peri and Urban (2006) emphasize the pivotal role of
the absorptive capacity of the host country or the productivity gap between the home and
the host country. That is, spillovers are larger if the technology gap is tighter which can be
justiﬁed e.g. due to skill-biased technologies. The absorptive capacity usually refers to fac-
tors like the quality of institutions, human capital, regulations etc. These ﬁnding are analog
23Note that the results are spurious if additional eﬀects of FDI are not accounted for. For example,
Aitken and Harrison (1999) do not control for the eﬀects of FDI on the market structure in Venezuela.
24Note however, that the author totaly abstracts from the possibility of long-run learning eﬀects of ﬁrms
in the host-country.
16to the ones of imitator-innovator models described earlier. Antras and Helpman (2004) and
Antras (2005) point out that technology transfers also depend crucially on the strategic de-
cisions of the investor. The foreign investor might want to outsource or externalize a certain
degree of knowledge to foreign aﬃliates or partners depending on ﬁrm-strategic considera-
tions. This approach discloses the possibility for a number of supplementary determinants
of technology spillovers from FDI. For example, the ﬁrm’s ’entry’-strategy into the foreign
market might change with the initial market structure in the host country. That is, the
investor might prefer to enter the market with a more sophisticated production technology
to escape from competition if the market structure in the host country is competitive.25 In
fact, Liang (2003) underlines the importance of this ’escape-competition eﬀect’ for FDI in
the Chinese telecommunication sector. Finally, Eichgreen and Tong (2005) and Mercereau
(2005) explore the competition of host countries in order to attract potential foreign in-
vestors, e.g. arising from the entry of new players like China or India. Summing up, the
success of FDI for the host country depends on a number of complementary factors that
pin down the probability for technology spillovers. Even though the literature examines
some mechanisms for FDI-spillovers, substantial further research needs to be dome in order
to isolate the key determinants of empirical diﬀerences across country, in particular with
respect to supportive policy measures. In this regard, we agree with the ﬁnal conclusion
of Grossman and Helpman (1995, 66): ”[to identify determinants of technology transfers]...
we will need models that pay closer attention to how knowledge is transmitted within and
between ﬁrms?”
Infrastructure:
A brief comparison of power generating capacities, telecommunication and transportation
equipments across countries suggest immediately a close connection between the provision
of infrastructure and a country’s past economic performance. A substantial amount of
empirical work conﬁrms this correlation between infrastructure investments and economic
growth across time (within ’a panel of’ countries).26 In fact, the prediction of a net positive
growth eﬀect of infrastructure investments constitutes a powerful growth strategy since
policymakers exhibit direct control over infrastructure investments/subsidies. Yet, it is
not surprising that episodes of high growth and economic activity comply with episodes
25This eﬀect is suggested by Aghion and Howitt (2005) in a diﬀerent framework.
26Gramlich (1994) or Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) survey the early literature.
17of high expenditures for (public) infrastructure. Thus, the main empirical challenge is the
identiﬁcation of cause and eﬀects between infrastructure investments and GDP-growth.
Indeed, several recent empirical contributions report a positive causal relation for diﬀerent
regions and time periods. Fernald (1999) shows that the rise in road services substantially
increased the productivity (TFP) across industry in the U.S. from 1953 to 1973.27 The au-
thor employs an implicit test for endogeneity by showing that productivity growth is above
average in vehicle intensive industries. Roeller and Waverman (2001) formulate a structural
model for the supply and demand of telecommunication infrastructure to separate cause
and eﬀects on aggregate production.28 They ﬁnd large positive eﬀects of telecommunication
investments on economic growth in a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970-90. Belaid
(2004) conﬁrms the results for a panel of 37 developing countries from 1985-2000. Finally,
Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005) apply an (internal) instrumental variables approach to estimate
a positive causal eﬀect of diﬀerent infrastructure measures on GDP-growth in a panel of
121 countries from 1960-2000. Besides, several empirical studies employ ﬁrm-level data on
business costs to investigate the exact microeconomic functioning of infrastructure capital.
In this regard, Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) ﬁnd
robust empirical evidence for a negative relation between ﬁrm-level business costs and the
provision of infrastructure capital in the economy. Moreover, Bougheas et al. (2000) de-
tect a positive relation between infrastructure capital and the degree of specialization in
intermediate production for the U.S. economy. The empirical evidence refers to a quite het-
erogenous set of countries, time periods or infrastructure variables. The impact on growth
appears to be substantial in advanced as well as developing countries for certain periods.29
Most part of the theoretical literature suggests that the provision of infrastructure aﬀects
economic growth boosting private capital investments. This literature is substantially in-
ﬂuenced by the work of Barro (1990) who incorporates productive public capital in an
extended two sector AK-growth model. He assumes a (Cobb-Douglas) production function
featuring constant returns to scale for the combination of private and infrastructure cap-
27He measures a rate of return of 100% before 1973 and a negative rate from 1973-89. To put it in the
words of Fernald (1999): ”the interstate highway system was very productive, but a second one would not
be”.
28The identiﬁcation of cause and eﬀects crucially hinges on the speciﬁcation of demand and supply
functions and congruence of price elasticities across the OECD countries.
29Roeller and Waverman (2001) and Belaid (2004) quantify similar elasticities of GDP with respect to
telephones per worker for advance (0.45) and developing countries (0.5) for similar time periods using
identical estimation techniques.
18ital. Thus, he implicitly supposes that (broader) capital accumulation, which is studied
by neoclassical theory, and technological knowledge, which is necessary to counteract di-
minishing returns, are one and the same. It follows that infrastructure or private capital
investments feature not only level but also growth eﬀects in the long-run. Yet, the growth
eﬀect of infrastructure is limited due to a ﬁnancing by distortional taxes. Consequently, the
author can derive an optimal level of infrastructure capital. In the literature this ﬁnding is
referred to as the Barro Curve. It predicts that high saving rates and eﬃcient tax systems
sustain high economic growth. This approach has been generalized in several ways since
- Turnovsky (1997) accounts for public capital which is subject to congestion, Kosempel
(2004) for the case of ﬁnitely lived households, Turnovsky (2000) for an elastic labor sup-
ply and Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002) for an open-economy framework. An alternative
approach is followed by Bougheas et al. (2000) who show that infrastructure investments
increase an economy’s degree of specialization.
The link between infrastructure and private capital accumulation may be appropriate to
explain its growth-eﬀect in less developed countries. Yet, it may not be adequate to explain
recent growth performance in advanced countries. In a recent study, we argue that infras-
tructure reduces costly distortions between the ﬁnal output and intermediate sector in a
model of R&D based growth and hence enhances investments in R&D and innovations. This
reﬁnement is important at least for two reasons: (i) It relates long-run productivity/GDP-
growth to the stock of infrastructure capital instead of its growth rate (as in the former
literature). (ii) It comprises diﬀerent policy implications than the existing models which are
based on neoclassical inference. That is, we identify policies that inﬂuence the eﬃciency of
the R&D sector (higher education, industrial and innovation policy, absorptive capacity),
instead of neoclassical policies that inﬂuence the saving behavior, to determine the growth
eﬀect of infrastructure investments. In addition, we ﬁnd positive empirical evidence in favor
of a positive causal impact from (telecommunication) infrastructure investments on subse-
quent R&D investments in the business sector for 36 advanced countries from 1975-2000.
This eﬀect interacts positively with the amount of higher education, property rights and
the initial R&D stock. In turn, we ﬁnd no evidence that infrastructure investments inﬂu-
ence private capital investments in our sample. The approach can easily be extended to an
imitator-innovator framework, where the provision of infrastructure capital in the imitat-
ing country determines the probability of convergence and the stationary TFP-diﬀerence
19between the less developed and advanced country. So far, the empirical relation between
infrastructure and productivity growth is studied by Fernald (1999), Bougheas et al. (2000)
and Hulten et al. (2003) who analyze the impact of infrastructure on productivity and
product specialization in the U.S. and India respectively. In fact, as we outlined above, Ro-
drik (2005) highlights the importance of initial infrastructure investments for TFP-growth
in India since 1980. Figure 11 displays the TFP-growth and the change in the stock of
paved roads (as % of total roads) and railroads in India from 1960-2000, which supports
the author’s view. The same analysis is carried out for China in Figure 12 for the stock of
paved roads and telephone mainlines per worker. Finally, Figure 13 and 14 illustrate the
accelerations of the infrastructure stocks and TFP for China from 1960-2000. Consequently,
the ﬁgures suggest that the provision of infrastructure capital in connected to TFP-growth
in these two major success stories in terms of economic growth during the last three decades.
Macroeconomic stability:
The appearance of endogenous growth theory challenges the traditional separation of busi-
ness cycle and growth theory in the earlier literature. Conceptually, the notion of capital
in endogenous growth theory is broader, e.g. capturing the accumulation of knowledge.
Thus, short-run ﬂuctuations in private capital entail externalities on the stock of knowl-
edge/technologies and hence future investment opportunities and growth. The work of King
et al. (1988) represents a prominent example for the integration of growth and business cy-
cle theory. The authors incorporate endogenous growth in a real business cycle model in
order to show that temporary shocks can induce permanent eﬀects on output. It follows
that national policies can induce long-run growth eﬀects.30
The empirical literature has evolved predominantly in two distinct branches that separate
the dynamics of low and high frequencies. An important exception reﬂects contribution of
Ramey and Ramey (1995). The authors reveal a negative correlation between the overall
volatility and the trend of GDP growth which is robust to the inclusion of the investment
share of GDP. They apply cross section and (static) panel estimations for a sample of 92
as well as a subset of 24 OECD countries from 1960-1985. In addition, they are not able to
ﬁnd a robust empirical correlation between inﬂation and the share of aggregate investment.
Furthermore, they show that most of the correlation between volatility and growth is due
30The same causation is predicted by business cycle models with investment irreversibilities; e.g. compare
Aizenman and Marion (1993).
20to variations in unexpected innovations to GDP-growth by considering deviations from a
forecasting equation. Hence, their results suggest that uncertainty induced by nominal or
real innovations links volatility and productivity growth. These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by
study of Aghion, Marios, Banerjee and Manova (2005). The authors detect a negative
causation from (exogenous) commodity price shocks to economic growth. Moreover, they
illustrate that commodity price shocks reduce investments in R&D but not overall private
investments. Hence, the transmission channel is via productivity growth and not factor
accumulation.
Several studies analyze the direct impact of certain macro-policies on economic growth.
Fisher (1993) focuses on the link between inﬂation and GDP-growth. He ﬁnds a nega-
tive empirical relationship between the two employing cross sectional and panel growth
regressions for yearly data. The author also investigates the causal mechanism by splitting
the sample into two sub-periods of mainly demand (1960-1972) or supply shocks (1973-
1988). He argues that adverse supply shocks, which entail periods of high inﬂation and
low growth, are the main source for the endogeneity of inﬂation, but ﬁnds no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the relation in both periods.31 Several studies analyze nonlinear eﬀects
of inﬂation on growth.32 Barro and Lee (1996a) applies low frequency data (10-year aver-
ages) and detects a negative relationship if annual inﬂation exceeds 20%. Similarly, Bruno
and Easterly (1998) exclusively ﬁnd a strong negative temporary correlation if inﬂation sur-
passes a speciﬁed value of 40% (”inﬂation crises”). Sarel (1996) endogenously determines
a structural break in the inﬂation-growth relationship if the former exceeds 8%. Along
the same lines, Sepehri and Moshiri (2004) estimate diﬀerent structural breaks which vary
from 5-15% depending on a country’s stage of economic development. In contrast, Fisher
(1993) uses splines, setting breakpoints at 15% and 40%, to test for non-linearities and ﬁnds
that the negative correlation between inﬂation and TFP growth is, if anything, larger in
low-inﬂation (OECD-)countries. In summary, most authors report evidence of a stronger
negative relation in episodes of high inﬂation, albeit there exists a striking disagreement as
to where that threshold is.
31The diﬃculty to identify a causal relation between inﬂation and growth is a general problem in the
literature since appropriate instrumental variables for inﬂation barely exist. The most promising instru-
mental variable approach is due to Cukierman and Webb (1993) who incorporate measures of central bank
independence as instrumental variables and detect negative correlations with economic growth.
32Intuitively, nonlinearities are appealing since there exist no economic advantages of excessive inﬂation.
Thus, periods of extreme inﬂation arguably represent scenarios where authorities lost control over inﬂation
dynamics and are expected to enforce counteracting policies. This reasoning also suggests that the degree
of uncertainty is aggravated by the level of inﬂation.
21Against this background, Easterly (2005) provides important insights with respect to the in-
terpretation of these results. He underlines that the negative correlation between national
policies (inﬂation, budget balance, real overvaluation, trade openness, and black market
premium) and growth crucially depends on inﬂation-outliers, which represent episodes of
low institutional quality. In particular, he illustrates that the explanatory power of national
policies disappears if one controls for institutional measures such as geographic and ethno-
linguistic variables.33
Fisher (1993) stresses three potential theoretical mechanisms to justify a link between inﬂa-
tion and growth: (i) a reduction in productivity growth because of distortions in the infor-
mational content of the price level due to aggregate uncertainty; (ii) a reduction in capital
accumulation stemming from temporary hold up of investment decisions in the presence
of aggregate uncertainty; (iii) inﬂation tax on returns from capital and R&D investment if
investors must hold cash-in-advance. Aghion, Marios, Banerjee and Manova (2005) provide
an alternative explanation. They show that volatility inﬂuences the composition of private
investments. More speciﬁc, they distinguish between more productive but risky investments
from secure but return-dominates ones. It follows that an increase in in the idiosyncratic
risk of innovative investments induces a shift of private investments into return-dominated
projects if ﬁnancial markets are incomplete.34 The investment composition eﬀect provides
a potential for national policies to aﬀect innovative activities and hence aggregated TFP-
and GDP-growth. That is, macroeconomic stability inﬂuences the quality of investments
without changing its quantity - private capital accumulation. In this regard, Aghion and
Howitt (2005) argue that the study of Easterly (2005) is based on average policies over
time and abstracts from the eﬀects of shocks and business cycles. Thus, he ignores the
potential mechanism for macro-policies to inﬂuence economic growth through stabilizing
the economy and improving the ability of producers to smooth out the eﬀects of cycles and
shocks. In fact, Aghion and Howitt (2005) ﬁnd that counter-cyclical policies (e.g. primary
budget deﬁcit) increase economic growth using annual panel data on 17 OECD countries
from 1965-2001.35 The authors distinguish several macro-policies and reveal that counter-
33Easterly (2005) estimates cross section as well as dynamic panel growth regressions based on the general
method of moments.
34In the empirical part, the authors are indeed able to identify a positive interaction term between
volatility and ﬁnancial development so that the negative eﬀect of volatility declines in the degree of ﬁnancial
development.
35The set of countries exhibit sound institutions so that Easterly would have predicted no policy eﬀect. In
addition, Aghion and Howitt (2005) illustrate that the eﬀect declines in the degree of ﬁnancial development
22cyclical public investments or direct ﬁrm subsidies are growth-enhancing while government
consumption is not. Summing up, a negative relation between volatility and growth pro-
vides a mechanism for a growth-enhancing eﬀect of (stabilizing) macro policies.
Financial development:
The degree of ﬁnancial development of an economy has long been considered as an engine
for economic growth and development. The theoretical literature provides several explana-
tions that support this view. Acemolgu and Zilibotti (1997) emphasize that the possibility
to diversify investment projects improves investment opportunity of ﬁrms. They assume
that more productive investments are also riskier. Thus, the lower the opportunities for
risk-sharing activities, the slower is the accumulation of capital. In addition, their model
predicts that the uncertainty of a country’s growth process is linked to its degree of ﬁnan-
cial development. That is, shocks impede economic growth when risk-sharing opportunities
are low. However, in the absence of larger shocks, growth and in turn better ﬁnancial
institutions can still develop in these countries. It follows that ”luck” determines to a cer-
tain extend the path of economic development in their world.36 Among others, King and
Levine (1993a) and Aghion, Marios, Banerjee and Manova (2005) formalize that the qual-
ity of private investments is related to the outside ﬁnancing opportunities. Thus, ﬁnancial
intermediation promotes innovative activities and hence economic growth.
While most economist would agree that ﬁnancial development is good for growth, there ex-
ists several alternative ﬁnancial systems. Financial intermediation may be based on stock
markets or credits. Numerous contributions to the literature from diﬀerent backgrounds an-
alyze implications of competing ﬁnancial systems. The development of imitator-innovator
growth models and the formalization of the process of technology adoption adds a new di-
mension to think about competing ﬁnancial systems. That is, a market based system may
be more adequate to ﬁnance investments in technologically developed, R&D based coun-
tries since stock markets are more appropriate to monitor the quality of products. However,
producers in technological backward countries need to adopt/imitate foreign technologies
in order to compete in the world market. This learning process takes time and delays the
’break-even’ of investments. Moreover, ﬁrms in less developed countries do often not dispose
of internal ﬁnancing sources (to ﬁnance riskier projects in the presence of incomplete ﬁnan-
of an economy (negative interaction term).
36The fact that the variability of economic growth is higher in less developed economies is well documented
by economic historians.
23cial markets). Therefore, a ﬁnancial system based on long-term relations between producers
and investors may be more adequate. This reasoning already dates back to Gerschenkron
(1962). It is an application of the idea that diﬀerent stages of development require diﬀerent
institutions (appropriate institutions) which is outlined above.
There exists robust empirical evidence on the positive impact of ﬁnancial development on
long-run growth, e.g. King and Levine (1993b), Levine (1997). The degree of ﬁnancial devel-
opment is typically approximated by the amount of liquid liabilities, the amount of private
credit relative to GDP or the value of private banks relative to central banks assets. These
studies apply dynamic panel estimations based on a large number of advanced as well as less
developed countries, whereby the heterogeneous sample is important to ensure the validity
of the ﬁnancial proxies. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000b) apply an instrumental variable
approach to identify a causal relation running from the degree of ﬁnancial intermediation
to economic growth. Moreover, they show that diﬀerences of ﬁnancial developments across
countries can be explained by diﬀerences in legal and accounting systems. Benhabid and
Spiegel (2000) and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000a) investigate whether the link between
ﬁnancial development and growth is due to improvements in private factor accumulations
or productivity (TFP). The former detect positive evidence in favor of both transmission
channels while the latter ﬁnd larger (more robust) eﬀects in favor of TFP-growth.
Industrial & Innovation policy:
Endogenous growth models are based on the assumption that current R&D entails a pos-
itive externality on future research. Likewise, most approaches account for the existence
of monopoly rents from innovations that justify investments in R&D.37 These market im-
perfections lead to ineﬃciencies in the decentralized equilibrium allocations which imply a
potential role for public policies to inﬂuence innovations and growth. The general equilib-
rium welfare eﬀects of such policies, however, may not be obvious ex ante as is underlined
by Grossman and Helpman (1995). For example, an export subsidy in favor of an manufac-
turing sector, which is intensive in unskilled labor, induces a rise the equilibrium wage and
hence a decline in the return to skilled labor in manufacturing. This enhances innovations
since the R&D sector absorbs some of the released human capital from the manufacturing
37Hellwig and Irmen (2001) illustrate that endogenous technical change is still possible under perfect
competition.
24sector. Still, the equilibrium welfare eﬀect also depends on resulting change in the output of
the intermediate sector. Grossman and Helpman (1995) also stress that innovation policies
may have an international transmission eﬀect. For example, a permanent subsidy for R&D
in one country might reduce R&D investments of the trade partner by rasing the costs of
human capital in both countries via the equalization of factor prices. In the following, we
analyze the equilibrium eﬀects of policies that inﬂuence both sources of ineﬃciency: (i) the
market structure in the intermediate sector and (ii) direct subsidies to R&D.
The standard model of endogenous technological change following Romer (1990) or Aghion
and Howitt (1992) implies that an increase in product market competition between inter-
mediate producers reduces expected future proﬁts from innovations and hence the rate of
technical change (’rent dissipation eﬀect’). In addition, more intense competition lowers
the expected durability of new innovations (’creative destruction’) and hence the incen-
tives to innovate in the quality ladder model ` a la Aghion and Howitt (1992). In contrast,
Aghion et al. (2001) extend the basic framework to incorporate an ’escape competition
eﬀect’. They consider an ogopolistic intermediate sector where innovation enables a ﬁrm to
brake away from intense competition for a certain period of time. It follows that an increase
in product market competition involves an innovation-tradeoﬀ: It reduces the static gains
from imperfect competition, but enhances the incentive to innovate in order to escape from
competition. The authors show that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates if the ogopolistic ﬁrms are
close technological rivals (’neck-and-neck’), while the second outweighs when one ﬁrm has
a large technological lead. This results in an inverted U-relationship between the incentives
to innovate and the intensity of product market competition. Again, this ﬁnding demon-
strates the appropriateness of diﬀerent policies in diﬀerent stages of economic development:
Little competition does not impede growth when ﬁrms are far from the world technology
frontier, but matters if they catch up and compete with leading edge innovators.
Most empirical evidence suggest a positive relation between the degree of product market
competition and (productivity) growth. Nickell (1996) applies several measures to approx-
imate competition using ﬁrm level panel data of 147 stock market listed ﬁrms in the UK
from 1975-1986. He detects a positive relation between TFP (-growth) and import pen-
etration and a negative with higher concentration rates or higher rents. Blundell et al.
(1999) reveal similar results from dynamic panel estimations of 340 UK-ﬁrms from 1972-
1982. They ﬁnd that less competitive industries induce fewer aggregate innovations using
25the SPRU innovation data set to approximate innovations and concentration or import
penetration data to approximate competition across sectors. Yet, they estimate a positive
correlation between the market share and innovations within industries. Finally, Aghion,
Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005) provide positive empirical evidence in favor
of the inverted U-relationship between patent rates and product market competition in a
panel of manufacturing ﬁrms from 1973-1992.38
Aghion and Howitt (2005) formalize a similar positive relation between technical change
and entry, exit or turnover rates. They illustrate that this link not only results from direct
innovations of new entrants but also from an ’escape entry eﬀect’. Likewise the ’escape
competition eﬀect’, the threat of potential entrants augments the incumbents incentives to
innovate. Again, the model implies that the ’escape entry eﬀect’ is stronger if a ﬁrm is
closer to the technology frontier. Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2005a) provide
positive empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In addition, Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2003) detect that productivity diﬀerences between Europe and the U.S. can be explained
by higher entry costs and lower degree of turnover in Europe. Aghion, Burgess, Redding
and Zilibotti (2005b) analyze the eﬀect of entry deregulation in less developed countries.
They employ panel data for Indian ﬁrms from 1980-1997 and ﬁnd that policy reform have
no inﬂuence on GDP-growth. Yet, the interaction term between entry deregulations and
labor market regulations is positive which implies that entry aﬀects growth in industries
with less restrictive labor markets.39
In the original Romer (1990) model public subsidize for R&D enhance the rate of techni-
cal change. However, common wisdom suggests that there exist some natural limits for
this growth-channel. In fact, Jones (1995) pinpoints that the number of resources devoted
to R&D grew exponentially in advanced countries since 1950 without shifting the trend in
growth. Therefore, Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998) introduce so called semi-endogenous
growth models to match these empirical facts. In this class of models, long-run growth (in
the stock of knowledge) can only be sustained if the level of R&D resources (the labor force)
rises accordingly. It follows that R&D subsidies have no impact on long-run technical change
and hence growth. Yet, Howitt (1999) extends the framework to show that long-run growth
38The authors measure the degree of competition by the Lerner-index as well as exogenous policy reforms.
The degree of technical neck-and-neckness between ﬁrms is measured by the distance of a ﬁrm’s TFP from
the technology frontier.
39For positive evidence in favor of a positive relation between innovations and exit deregulations or
turnover rates see Comin and Mulani (2005) and Fogel et al. (2005), respectively.
26eﬀects of R&D subsidies are still sustainable.40 Finally, Segertrom (2000) generalizes the
approach of Howitt (2000) and isolates a tradeoﬀ in public R&D subsidies for innovation
and growth. He also distinguishes between vertical and horizontal R&D, whereas the former
reﬂects improvements in the quality of existing products and the latter increases number of
intermediate goods (industries) in the economy. In addition, he assumes that the complex-
ity of new innovations (need for resources) increases with the stock of knowledge. Thus,
more resources (labor) must be devoted to R&D over time in order to sustain the rate of
innovations. Segertrom (2000) shows that under these conditions R&D subsidies can never
permanently increase horizontal and vertical innovation rates because they do not aﬀect
population growth (the resource pool). However, it is still possible that subsidies in favor
of either the qualitative or the quantitative dimension impact on overall innovations and
growth if the parameter constellation is such that one innovation channel is stronger. He
highlights that in general one channel will be stronger so that onesided R&D subsidies might
either promote or impede economic growth depending on the parameter values in both re-
search sectors.41 This study can explain the ambiguous empirical cross-country evidence of
public R&D subsidies and demonstrates that policymakers may need some detailed knowl-
edge about the bottlenecks of diﬀerent research channels in their economy. Likewise, Nelson
and Romer (1996) distinguish basic research by universities from practical innovations by
industries. However, they assume that un-internalized social returns to R&D are so large
that advanced countries still under-invests in R&D. More speciﬁcally, Nelson and Romer
(1996) presume that basic research provides the pool for practical innovators to invent new
products. In this regard, they stress that extreme onesided government subsidies might not
be eﬀective, in particular, when they involve a reduction in the budgets for the other type.
3 Hypotheses to be tested
The literature review underlines that public policies can inﬂuence innovations and growth
in various ways. Yet, it also demonstrates that policy eﬀects are often far from obvious
ex ante. Instead, some detailed knowledge of the stage of developments or country-speciﬁc
characteristics are necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. Still, the empirical growth
40He allows for horizontal and vertical R&D and links economic growth to the growth rate (not the level)
of the population. His models is also in line with the Jones (1995) facts.
41The two research channels may be interpreted as basic research (horizontal) and learning-by-doing
(vertical).
27literature provides multiple examples for public policies which have promoted technological
catch-up and sustainable growth. In the following, we use the recent theoretical insights
outlined above to develop veriﬁable hypothesis that help to gain insights how and which
public policies are appropriate to foster innovation and growth.
The literature on human capital and growth suggests that the level of human capital is
a key input factor for R&D and the diﬀusion of knowledge (see above). Benhabid and
Spiegel (1994, 2002) provide some empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis based
on educational measures. In contrast, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) do not ﬁnd evidence
for the R&D externality of human capital based on educational measures in a sub-set of
OECD countries. We discussed above that more appropriate measures of human capital
are available, which are based on qualitative test scores of the labor force. These have not
been related to the diﬀusion of knowledge and technological catch up to test the Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994) hypothesis, yet.
A positive relation between human capital and the diﬀusion of knowledge on a macroeco-
nomic level does still not explain how the knowledge is transferred between agents or ﬁrms.
The literature underlines the importance of local complementarities between human capital
(and R&D). If technologies are directly transmitted via agents, the (global) mobility of
labor aﬀects regional stocks of knowledge/technologies. It follows that regional/national
’brain gain policies’ provide an important policy tool to foster innovations and regional
development. This hypothesis can be tested via surveys from corresponding agents.
Recent work of Aghion and Howitt (2005) suggests that tertiary education is more impor-
tant for advanced (innovating) countries, while primary and secondary education is crucial
for less developed (imitating) regions. Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2005)
test this hypothesis in an international perspective employing a panel of 22 OECD coun-
tries. Their positive evidence is not robust to the inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀects. It is
straightforward to test this hypothesis for a larger set of more heterogeneous countries. In
fact, the inclusion of non-OECD countries appears to be crucial to test for the importance
of basic education for the adoption of foreign technologies.
Apart from the static gains of trade liberalizations, the literature emphasizes the dynamic
gains from the diﬀusion of technologies via trade in goods. It follows that the technological
progress of the trade partners impacts on the potential scope for technology spillovers. In-
28deed, a number of empirical studies aﬃrm this hypothesis. These studies apply macro- and
industry-level data from advances countries. In fact, the evidence in favor of this mecha-
nism is more robust for industry data, see Keller (2002b). This underlines the importance
of microeconomic data to test the hypothesis. Therefore, we apply ﬁrm-level data. In ad-
dition, we investigate the eﬀect of trade (partners) on the adoption of foreign technologies
in transition countries (new EU members) to compared our ﬁndings with the earlier results
from advanced economies.
The literature provides ambiguous empirical evidence for the hypothesis that FDI creates
growth-enhancing technology spillovers for the host country. Most studies focus on ad-
vanced countries and the few case studies for transition countries yield conﬂicting empirical
evidence (Venezuela vs. Costa Rica, China). Theoretical models suggest that the link be-
tween FDI and growth depends crucially on the absorptive capacity of the host country and
the investment strategy of the foreign investor. Thus, future research on the link between
FDI and growth needs to isolate the empirical relevance of such complementary factors.
The identiﬁcation of the determinants of productivity spillovers from FDI help to under-
stand the ambiguous empirical results across regions. Moreover, it enables policymakers to
create an optimal economic environment (e.g. legislation, joint ventures) that maximizes
the the gains from FDI for the host country.
Empirical studies illustrate that innovative infrastructure investments enhance economic
growth. The theoretical and empirical contributions focus on private factor accumulation
as the relevant growth-channel. We test if investments in telecommunication infrastructure
stimulate factor accumulations, productivity growth or both using dynamic panel techniques
for 36 countries from 1975-2004. A link between technical progress and the provision of
infrastructure capital can be justiﬁed in a simple extension of basic R&D based endogenous
growth models. The distinction between the eﬀect on capital accumulation and R&D in-
volves crucial policy implications (e.g. higher education, innovation policy vs. neoclassical
inference). The framework can extended to examine the hypothesis that the provision of
infrastructure capital in less developed countries improves their ability to catch-up with the
world technology frontier (absorptive capacity).42
42We need to employ TFP-measures instead of R&D expenditures to approximate technical change since
the latter is not available for a larger set of countries.
29The classical dichotomy between the short- and long-run limits the long-run growth-impact
of macroeconomic policies right from the start. However, endogenous growth theory pro-
vides a channel for short-run ﬂuctuations to inﬂuence long-run growth. Thus, macro-policies
that smooth the short-run variability of output augment long-run growth. Indeed, this
view is supported by recent empirical studies. The investment composition eﬀect, outlined
above, suggests that the link is due to productivity eﬀects instead of factor accumulation.
Therefore, we investigate if macroeconomic volatility impedes innovation and hence growth.
The literature provides various theoretical and empirical support that ﬁnancial develop-
ment boosts innovation and growth. Still, ﬁnancial development can be linked to diﬀerent
ﬁnancial systems. Gerschenkron (1962) already argues that long-run relations between pro-
ducers and ﬁnancial investors (e.g. credit-based) might be more eﬀective in technologically
backward countries, while market-based might be preferable in advanced economies. We
explore this hypothesis empirically using the amount of private credits or ﬁnancial deposits
to approximate a credit- (bank-) based system and the volume of stock market trade and
the rate of stock market capitalization to measure the relative importance of a market-based
ﬁnancial system in an economy.
The framework of Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt
(2005) implies a tradeoﬀ in product market competition for innovation, whereas the positive
eﬀect outweighs if the ﬁrm is closer to the (world) technology frontier. This non-linearity
in the relation between competition and growth involves that the eﬀect of product market
regulations (industrial policy) depends on the stage of development of a country. It might
very well be the case that ’excessive’ product market deregulations impede economic growth
in transition countries, but promote growth in advanced countries (EU). The eﬀects must
be analyzed separately in diﬀerent countries since most of the existing empirical evidence
stems from advanced countries (U.S., U.K.). Thus, we will test which industrial policies
impact on innovation and growth in old and new EU member states.
The emergence of R&D based growth models induced a lively political and academical de-
bate if R&D subsidies can boost innovation and growth. Recent endogenous growth theory
provides conﬂicting predictions depending on the application of endogenous or so called
semi-endogenous growth models (see above). Cross-country empirical evidence based on
30macro-data also yields ambiguous results. The application of microeconomic data implies
a more direct approach to examine the impact of R&D subsidies on the dynamics of in-
novation at the appropriate (ﬁrm-) level. Moreover, we focus on a sample of transition
countries since these economies feature a large potential for technological catch-up. The
results will help to discriminate between the conﬂicting theories and reﬁne the determinants
of successful R&D subsidies at the ﬁrm-level.
Finally, we emphasize that many determinants of innovation and growth, which can be inﬂu-
enced by public policies, are likely to be strategic complements or substitutes. That is, the
provision of infrastructure, human capital and innovation policies are strategic complements
if they are components of a country’s absorptive capacity. Thus, improvements in human
capital enhance growth-eﬀects of infrastructure or R&D subsidies. In addition, the scarcity
of one factor (e.g. infrastructure capital) might even block any potential growth-eﬀects of
FDI, trade or innovation policies. These interrelations need to be tested empirically by the
inclusion of the corresponding interaction terms.
4 Data sets
Barro and Lee (1996b) provide an extensive panel database on measures of human capital.43
The database includes various measures of diﬀerent degrees of education and test scores
in mathematics and science of the labor force in various countries. In addition, de la
Fuente and Domenech (2002) construct an alternative database on human capital for fewer
countries. They argue that their proxies incorporate less measurement errors than the
Barro-Lee data-set.44
The Penn World Tables (PWT) and the World Bank (World Development Indicators -
WDI) have published data on several measures of trade openness: The amount of imports
relative to GDP, the amount of trade in goods to GDP. Additional proxies are available
from Sachs and Warner (1995). Finally, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) presents extended
(policy-) measures of openness and trade liberalization.
Panel data on FDI for various countries are available from the OECD and the WDI. The
former also supply the the amount of R&D investments of foreign aﬃliates for several
43The updated version from 2001 is also available.
44The identiﬁcation of the location of agents that transfer knowledge across regions and the corresponding
brain-gain policies to attract them, will be based on literature research and internet searches.
31OECD countries. The Bocconi University disposes of a ﬁrm level database on foreign
investments in several Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, the Amadeus
database contains data of balance sheets at the ﬁrm level for almost all European countries.
Finally, the Zephir-database contains M&A, IPO and venture capital deals with links to
detailed ﬁnancial company information. This database would allow to collect information on
foreign investments undertaken in Latin America and Asian countries from 1997 onwards.
Furthermore, the University of Ljubljana has access to CIS, trade and FDI ﬁrm-level data
on Slovenian enterprises between 1996 and 2002.
The WDI-database contains information on social-cultural characteristics. Eurobarometer
and Latinobarometro represent supplementary sources for institutional measures for the
EU and Latin America. Institutional measures for (intellectual) property rights, law and
order and economic freedom stem from various editions of the Fraser Institute’s Economic
Freedom.
Data on the following infrastructure measures for a large panel of countries are provided by
the WDI-database and Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005): telephone and mobile phones mainlines
per worker, road and railroad networks, ratio of paved roads to total roads, telephone
mainlines waiting list, electrical power production and energy losses.
Approximations of the volatility of several indicators of economic performance or macro-
policy variables can be easily constructed from the underlying series which are available for
a large set of countries and time-periods.
Levine, Loyaza and Beck (2000) provide an extensive database on various measures of ﬁnan-
cial development for over 120 countries from 1970-2000. The database contains measures
such as the amount of private credits issued by deposit money banks as % of GDP, the
stock market value traded as % of GDP, the amount of deposits of the ﬁnancial system,
the amount of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of deposit money bank vs. central bank
assets or the stock market capitalization rate.
The OECD-STAN database and the UNIDO have published time-series for various countries
of economic indicators on an industry level. Finally, the OECD, the ILO and the World
Bank provide data for case studies in the automobile industry. In particular, the ILO data
base contains up-to-date information on socio-economic variables from 200 countries.
325 Research papers
1.) Human capital and growth (ESRI)
2.) The emergence of ”brain gain policies” as a new strategy for regional development and
innovation (WUW)
3.) Is openness a factor of competitiveness for the EU? (VUA)
4.) The impact of diﬀerent types of knowledge transfer on innovation and productivity
growth in new member states (FELU)
5.) The role of foreign ﬁrms in local economic development in CEECs (UNIBOC)
6.) Institutional quality and comparative advantage (UNIBOC)
7.) Infrastructure, growth and technological change (ZEI)
8.) Is macroeconomic volatility detrimental to innovation and growth? (ESRI)
9.) The role of institutions on growth: Diﬀerent institutions for diﬀerent stages of develop-
ment? (ZEI)
10.) Clusters in India and CEECs. (CIBAM)
11.) Value capture and sustainable value creation from technological innovation: The role
of business and public policy. (CIBAM)
12.) European industrial policy: Perspectives and recent trends. (CIBAM)
13.) The role of the government in the stimulation of R&D in dynamic growth regions.
(VUA)
14.) The interdependency between EU and dynamic growth regions: The automobile in-
dustry case-study. (VUB)
15.) How eﬃcient are public R&D subsidies in promoting ﬁrm’s innovation and growth?
(FELU)
33A Appendix
Table 1: Sources of growth in Latin America
Figure 1: El Salvador - failure of institutional reforms
34Figure 2: India’s growth takeoﬀ
Figure 3: Growth and manufacturing across Indian states before 1980
Figure 4: Growth and manufacturing across Indian states after 1980
35Table 2 - World Bank’s ’Star Globalizers’
Country Growth rate in the 1990s Trade policies
China 7.1% Average tariﬀ rate 31.2%,
national trade barriers,
not a WTO member
Vietnam 5.1% Tariﬀs range between 30 − 50%,
national trade barriers and state trading,
not a WTO member
India 3.3% Tariﬀs average 50.5% (2. highest in the world)
Uganda 3.0% Moderate reform
Source: Collier and Dollar (2001: 6)
36Figure 5: Distribution of World’s GDP
Source: Keller (2004)
Figure 6: Distribution of World’s R&D
Source: Keller (2004)
37Figure 7: Share of R&D investments of US-owned aﬃliates in Canada - pharmaceutical sector
Source: Keller (2004)
Figure 8: Spillovers vs. arm’s length technology licensing
Source: Keller (2004)
38Figure 9: Share of US-owned aﬃliates in host country
Source: Keller (2004)
Figure 10: Foreign-owned aﬃliates in the U.S.
Source: Keller (2004)
39Figure 11: India’s ’growth-takeoﬀ’: The change in infrastructure stocks and TFP-growth
Data: PWT, Barro and Lee (2001), Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005)
Figure 12: China’s ’growth-takeoﬀ’: The change in infrastructure stocks and TFP-growth
Data: PWT, Barro and Lee (2001), Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005)
40Figure 13: Sources of growth in China - telephones mainlines per worker and TFP
Data: Bosworth and Collins (2003) and Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005)
Figure 14: Sources of growth in China - paved roads and TFP
Data: Bosworth and Collins (2003) and Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005)
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